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Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law:
On the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein
CHRISTIAN ZAPF* AND EBEN MOGLEN**

The central article of faith of the traditional understanding of the Rule of Law
is that precedent uniquely determines the outcome of legal cases. Skepticism
about that faith, however, is widespread. Critical Legal Scholars, as well as their
intellectual ancestors, the Legal Realists, have frequently attacked the legitimacy of the received model and the formalist view of the relationship between
the law and its individual applications that underlies the model. The common
aim of these attacks is to demonstrate that the law is indeterminate in outcome
and that the supposed constraints of the Rule of Law on judges are fictions.
Not all of these antiformalist criticisms are equally well founded and this
article seeks to refute one of them. The article takes issue with an attack that
might be called "the argument from the indeterminacy of language," which,
roughly speaking, denies that legal texts-and, for that matter, all texts-have
meaning in and of themselves. Advocates of the linguistic indeterminacy argument maintain that the applications of words cannot be "read off" from those
words in a straightforward way. Their claim is not simply that some words are
ambiguous or vague and that we therefore cannot be certain of proper application in some instances. More radically, the argument's proponents assert that the
application of all words is indeterminate if one only looks to the words
themselves to determine their meaning. They argue that certainty of application
depends on the consensus of an interpretive community about how a word
should be applied. The lack of textual guidance, so the argument proceeds,
opens the door to an unwarranted judicial freedom in the interpretation of legal
texts that is incompatible with the certainty in the application of words required
by the traditional understanding of the Rule of Law.
In seeking to refute the argument from the indeterminacy of language, the
first aim of this article is to demonstrate that the logical relation between words
and the applications that we read off from them is unproblematic. That is, the
article aims to show that the skeptics of meaning have created a problem where
none previously existed. The second aim is to show that the skeptics of meaning
misunderstood the account of language offered by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his
Philosophical Investigations. We argue not only that the proponents of the
linguistic indeterminacy argument mistakenly perceived the PhilosophicalInvestigations to be supportive of their skeptical challenge, but also that, in fact,
Wittgenstein offers an entirely persuasive account of why the relation between
words and their applications is unproblematic. Finally, the article considers the
intellectual history of skepticism about meaning in American legal theory,
* J.D., Columbia Law School, 1992. Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
** Professor of Law and Legal History, Columbia Law School.
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showing that the same issues have been raised before. Legal Realists, following
the invitation of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explored the same thicket, reaching the same disheartening, but deceptive, results.
Part I of the article describes the linguistic indeterminacy argument and its
intellectual history. It traces the antiformalists' attacks on the Rule of Law from
Lon Fuller's challenge to semantic formalism to the efforts of his heirs to
replace semantic formalism with certain "nonformalist" accounts of the relationship between words and their applications. We argue that these nonformalist
alternatives-the account of language as a calculus of rules and the interpretive
community account---do not offer viable accounts of meaning. Part I concludes
that the linguistic skeptics' failure to find a viable alternative account of
meaning to semantic formalism leaves them without an account of language,
even though, as a matter of common sense, it is quite plain that language does,
in a manner of speaking, "work" and that words do mean things. As an
incidental matter, the overview of the intellectual history of the linguistic
indeterminacy argument offered in Part I also shows how antiformalists sometimes misused Ludwig Wittgenstein's work in the Philosophical Investigations
to support their skeptical challenge to the Rule of Law.
Part II describes Wittgenstein's account of language. It explains that Wittgenstein's work, although antiformalist, cannot sensibly be thought to support the
linguistic indeterminacy argument, and that, instead, his description of the
relation between words and their applications provides a workable nonskeptical
account of meaning. Part III argues that the legal community could have
avoided this misreading of Wittgenstein if it had not been so particularly useful
to the political agenda of Critical Legal Scholars. Part IV shows that this
process is not unique to the contemporary context, having occurred during the
heyday of legal realism, when problems of interpretation first took center stage
for legal theorists.
I. THE LINGUISTIC INDETERMINACY ARGUMENT
A. THE MODEL OF THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS SKEPTICS

It is the claim of our political tradition that authority is not vested in
individuals who may exercise it arbitrarily, but in laws, which individuals apply
without personal discretion. We are governed by laws, not by men, because
legitimate government must rule by "settled, standing Laws" not by "Absolute
Arbitrary Power." 1
This supposed divide between the Rule of Law and the Rule of Men requires
legal precedent to determine the application of law, free from the influence of
men's discretion. But a precedent can only determine the outcome of new cases
if the precedent, in a manner of speaking, "contains" the applications to new
1. JOHN LOCKE, Of the Extent of the Legislative Power, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 337
(Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
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cases. That is, it must be possible to tell what applications of the precedent are
proper from the precedent itself. The relationship between the rule and its
applications must be "analytic." '2
An analytic relation between the legal rule and its applications, in turn,
requires that the words that make up a particular rule have an analytic relation
to the particular objects for which they stand. Unless words have definite
applications that can be "read off" from them, the rules that consist of these
words will not have an analytic relation to their applications. One way of
expressing these conclusions is to say that the Rule of Law requires a formalist
conception of the relationship between rules and their applications (rule formalism), and that, in turn, requires a formalist conception of the relationship
3
between individual words and their applications (semantic formalism).
Skepticism about the legitimacy of this model and the formalism it seems to
require is widespread.4 The skeptics argue that, for one reason or another, the
constraints imposed on judges by the Rule of Law are illusory. The skeptics
claim that precedent does not determine new cases and that the law is indeterminate in outcome. Instead, they maintain that the law is incapable of expressing
rules or principles that genuinely constrain judges and, conversely, is subject to
manipulation to reflect the personal preferences of judges. Accordingly, to the
skeptics, the Rule of Law proper, as opposed to the Rule of Men, seems
impossible to secure.5
Not all variants of this skepticism trace indeterminacy in law to an underlying
indeterminacy in language. The skeptics have many arrows in their quiver-the

2. We use "analytic" in a pre-Quinean way simply to mean that the application logically follows
from the rule itself. See WILLARD V.0. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT
OF VIEw 20 (2d ed. 1961).
3. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793-95 (1989)
(introducing the expressions "rule-formalism" and "semantic formalism").
4. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1986) (arguing that the Realists' indeterminacy thesis, and the subsequent Critical Legal
Scholars' utilization of that thesis, raise serious questions about mainstream legal philosophy); James
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685
(1985) (discussing different strands of the Critical Legal Studies movement that reject formalism and
share an assumption about the social power of rational discourse); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982) (arguing that one does not have to accept rule formalism in order to
appreciate "the centrality of textuality to the lawyer's enterprise"); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (agreeing with Critical Legal Scholars that legal reasoning
is political, not formal, but arguing that policy balancing is itself a value choice that excludes other
modes of discourse); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984) (arguing that Critical Legal Scholars' rejection of objectivity in legal reasoning is not
necessarily followed by nihilism); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1989) (arguing that attempts to circumvent judicial subjective preferences in legal reasoning, revealed by liberalism's rejection of formalism,
are inconsistent with a liberal standpoint).
5. In contrast, Christopher Kutz argues that the indeterminacies revealed by skeptical challenges to
the traditional model of the Rule of Law do not undermine the justifiability of legal conclusions.
Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103
YALE L.J. 997 (1994).
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linguistic indeterminacy argument is just one of them, and it is only this
argument that we take issue with in this article. 6
The linguistic indeterminacy argument denies that semantic formalism properly describes the way words work.7 Its proponents maintain that not words
themselves but readers' dispositions about how to apply words determine their
applications. As an extension of this contention, they argue that not laws
themselves but judges' dispositions about how to apply laws determine their
applications. Judges are thought to "simply beat[] the text into a shape which
will serve [their] own purpose.", 8 The only debate among the linguistic skeptics
concerns the existence and nature of extratextual constraints on this brutality
against the text. They ask whether the reader's dispositions about how to apply
a word are entirely unrestrained, 9 or are instead limited either by the collective
understanding of readers about how a word should be applied,' ° or at least by
certain principles concerning a word's application. Efforts to find determinate
meaning in a text by looking at the intent of the author" or shared canons of
legal interpretation 12 fall into this last category.
6. For example, Mark Kelman has claimed that the linguistic indeterminacy argument is a legacy of
Realism and is not an important element of Critical Legal Studies. He argues that the more contemporary indeterminacy argument is concerned not with the open-textured nature of language, but with the
choices judges have between a multiplicity of rules to apply-all of which determine a different
outcome. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). Duncan Kennedy's
work is, of course, of seminal significance for Critical Legal Studies on this theme. See Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see also
Altman, supra note 4 (discussing a variety of skeptical arguments); Kutz, supra note 5 (same).
7. See generally Stephen Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language,
Structuralism, and CriticalLegal Theory, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (1985) (analyzing structuralist ideas
about the independence of the subject through a Wittgensteinian lens); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (attacking positivism on the ground that rules constraining individual
interpretation are themselves in need of interpretation); Levinson, supra note 4 (demonstrating that
constitutional and textual interpretation inevitably require a leap of faith); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp:
The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 37 (1987) (exploring work of skeptic Stanley
Fish); Singer, supra note 4 (arguing against reliance on an explanation of legal rules that requires
assumption of determinacy); Tushnet, supra note 4 (criticizing Herbert Wechsler's neutral principles
from a supposedly Wittgensteinian position). Some of these essays and other useful pieces are collected
in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIc READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux

eds., 1988).
8. RICHARD RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (EssAYS: 1972-1980), at 151 (1982).
9. The main exponents of this nihilist view are Levinson, Schlag, and, probably, Brainerd. See
Brainerd, supra note 7; Levinson, supra note 7; Schlag, supra note 7.
10. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); Dietrich Busse,
Normtextauslegung als Regelfeststellung? Zur Rolle von Wittgensteins Regelbegrifffuer die Juristische
Methodenlehre, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 207 (Ota Weinberger et al. eds., 1988).
11. Classically, Lon Fuller represents this position. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958). Current scholarship often attacks this view,
although ordinarily the direct target is originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. Originalism presents problems not faced by ordinary intentionalism. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 4; Tushnet,
supra note 4.
12. For the most prominent account, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)

(arguing that interpretive principles accepted by consensus of legal community limit judges' freedom).
See also Fish, supra note 7 (arguing that extratextual conventions and practices limit judges); Owen M.
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When words themselves do not determine their applications, all the action is
with the reader and hence "all readings ...become songs of oneself."'' 3 The
debate about the collectivity of that song provides small comfort to our common
sense faith in the fact that the words in texts, legal or otherwise, have determinate meanings and confine our applications of them.
How did we arrive at this peculiar state of affairs?
B. THE HISTORY OF THE LINGUISTIC INDETERMINACY ARGUMENT

1. Lon Fuller's Challenge to Semantic Formalism
While it is generally thought today that the linguistic indeterminacy debate
between H.L.A. Hart 14 and Lon Fuller 15 belongs to a prehistoric era in legal
thought, Fuller is plainly the forebear of linguistic skeptics and antiformalists,
and it is from his criticism of Hart that their later positions derive. Thus, to
understand fully the skeptics' current arguments, it is necessary to explore the
Fuller-Hart debate and the subsequent interpretations of Fuller's position.
Fuller was the first to challenge the view that the applications of words can be
read off from the words themselves. While Hart maintained that the general
words we use have a core of settled meaning that allows for their straightforward application in standard cases, Fuller argued that understanding a word is
not straightforward and is a matter of understanding a rule for the application of
that word. 16 Second, Fuller argued that these rules for the application of words
were to be discovered by looking at the intentions, or purposes, of their
authors. 17 Fuller was unimpressed by the many cases in which it seemed
intuitive and obvious that a particular application of a word was proper. To him,
this did not show either that his account of meaning was overly cerebral and
complicated or that the applications of words could indeed be read off from the
words themselves as Hart had maintained. Rather, to Fuller, it showed merely
that, in many cases, the particular application of a word obviously falls within
the purpose of the rule for its application.
Hart's response to Fuller's challenge was to concede a "penumbra of uncertainty" 18 in the applications of words. Scholars generally found Hart's response
sufficient, and semantic formalism survived the day as the received doctrine of
linguistic stability-at least with regard to those applications of words that were
not in the "penumbra." 19
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982) (arguing that institutional "disciplining rules" constrain judges).
13. Levinson, supra note 4, at 383.
14. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958).
15. Fuller, supra note 11.
16. See id.
17. A summary of the Hart-Fuller debate is provided in Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, CAN. J.L.
& JuRis., July 1990, at 61, 65-68.
18. Hart, supra note 14, at 607.
19. Despite the common characterization, set out in the text, of the "core" of applications Hart
described, he was probably not a formalist. See Peter Lin, Wittgenstein, Language, and Law, 47 U.
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However, bigger rumblings were on the linguistic horizon, and this time legal
academics took the indeterminacy challenge more seriously. Although, for the
reasons discussed in Part II below, Ludwig Wittgenstein was not, in fact, a
linguistic skeptic at all, he did vigorously attack semantic formalism in his
Philosophical Investigations.20 That attack seemed to the linguistic skeptics to
reinvigorate Fuller's challenge to the view that a word's application could be

read off from the word itself and, as a consequence thereof, to jeopardize the
certainty of application of laws once again.
Over time, legal scholars became convinced that Wittgenstein had succeeded
in the Philosophical Investigations where Fuller had failed and that the "postWittgensteinian view of language" ' 2 1 destroyed Hart's formalism. As a result,
James Boyle, for example, writes:
(1) Words do not have "essences."
(2) Words do not have "core meanings."
(3) Language is, or can be, used in an infinite number of ways: it is a
malleable instrument for communication.
(4) That a word is most commonly used to mean X does not mean that X is
22
the "core," or "plain," or "essential" meaning of that word.
By the same token, Boyle proclaims:
[I]t seems that the success that such writers as Foucault and Derrida have had
in Britain and in the United States is partly due to the particularly corrosive
effect that the post-Wittgensteinian view of language has had on all the
academic discourses within those countries .... Wittgenstein's outstanding
contribution was that he flushed the medieval fascination with essences from
its most secure hiding-place-right under our noses-in the everyday objecti23
fication of linguistic meaning.
Mark Tushnet comments along a similar line. He maintains that the lesson of
realism is that legal rules have no objective content, and that this challenge to
the Rule of Law can be traced to "the problem of language to which Wittgen24
stein directed our attention."

TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 939 (1989); see also Brian A. Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The
Grammar of Scepticism and Law, 33 McGILL L.J. 451, 458-59 (1988) (arguing that a common
characterization, which sees Fuller as making a Wittgensteinian attack on semantic formalism, is
mistaken).
20. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958)

[hereinafter
21.
22.
23.
24.

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS].

Boyle, supra note 4, at 707 n.75.
Id. at 708-09 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 707 n.75.
Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 n.69 (1981).
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While the skeptics' attacks on semantic formalism, in part inspired by
Wittgenstein's work, truly did relegate semantic formalism to the garbage heap
of history, their success also created a serious problem. All at once, there was a
need for an entirely new, viable theory of language. What such a theory might
be was unclear. Fuller's theory-that certainty of application for words could be
obtained by looking to a rule for their application, which, in turn, was to be
discovered by looking at the intentions or purposes of their authors--did not
appear to be a strong candidate. At the common sense level, it was difficult to
see how, if words themselves could not determine their own applications
because semantic formalism was false, the purpose of the text, clearly a much
vaguer notion, could provide that certainty. The purposes and intentions of the
authors of legal texts were often many, sometimes contradictory, and occasionally impossible to apply to circumstances that the authors could not have
foreseen. 25 " 'Purposes' and 'intentions' were obviously just as conceptually
reified as 'plain meanings.' ,26
Second, there were profound conceptual problems with rule-based accounts
of language of the kind that Fuller offered. Unfortunately for the new skeptics,
Wittgenstein had attacked rule-based accounts of language in the Philosophical
27
Investigations with at least equal vigor as he had attacked semantic formalism.
The fatal flaws of this account, elaborated below, once again left the antiformalists without a proper theory of language.
2. Rule-Based Accounts of Language
Rule-based accounts "conceive of a language as a highly complex calculus of
rules, and ... conceive of understanding [the meaning of words] as a hidden
process of operating this calculus or depth-grammar." 28 Such accounts conceptualize the application of words as governed by rules for their application. As a
corollary of that fact, rule-based accounts see understanding the meaning of a
word as equivalent to grasping the rule for its application. The approach likens
language to other rule-governed activities such as chess or baseball: in each
case, normative constraints (i.e., rules) guide human action, and individual
actions, or moves, can be described as either correctly following a rule or failing
29
to do SO.
As an empirical matter, these rules for the application of words were (and
are), of course, suspect-no less suspect than semantic formalism's objects of
25. These criticisms of intentionalism are elaborated in Levinson, supra note 4; Tushnet, supra note
4. But see Charles Fied, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers'Intention,100 HARV. L. REV.
751 (1987) (arguing that it is empirically false that the intention of authors of old texts cannot be
discovered).
26. Boyle, supra note 4, at 712.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
28. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE at viii-ix (1984).
29. For a brief description of Wittgenstein's own use of the term "rule." see Brian Bix, The
Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein 's Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory,
CAN. J.L. & JURIS., July 1990, at 107.
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faith 30 that the rules replaced:
Rules which no [ordinary person] cites in explanations of [how to apply a
word], which no one refers to in justifying [how he has applied a word] or in
criticizing others who have [applied a word incorrectly], which need highpowered philosophers and linguists to discover them, and which, once formulated, are unintelligible to most people who allegedly follow them, are indeed
dubious objects. 3 '
However, the empirical unlikeliness of these linguistic rules was not the
argument that grabbed the imagination of the legal community. Instead, a
second argument that, even if linguistic rules existed as an empirical matter,
they could not, as a matter of logic, guide new applications of words, seemed
particularly relevant to the concerns of lawyers.32 If linguistic indeterminacy
generally was a matter of obvious importance to the viability of the Rule of Law
ideal, the claim that rules could not guide new applications seemed doubly
relevant to that ideal: law was much more clearly a rule-governed activity than
language, and skepticism about the capacity of rules to govern new cases
introduced a new source of instability into the Rule of Law.33
3. Rule-Skepticism
Both the argument that linguistic rules have no empirical foundation 34 and
30. For example, such "objects of faith" included "universals," "forms," or Wittgenstein's own
"simples," which he subscribed to in his earlier work. See LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS
LAolcO-PHMLOSOPHICUS (1922). See generally BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

119-32 (1945) (explaining Plato's theory of "ideas" or "forms" in The Republic).
31. BAKER & HACKER, supra note 28, at ix.
32. One of the most obvious means of access to these arguments was Charles Yablon's book review
of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Yablon concluded that "[l]awyers ...
considering the issues raised by Kripke's book in light of their own experience of the ... indeterminacy
of legal argument ... should find their understanding of what they do altered, and perhaps enriched."
Charles M. Yablon, Law andMetaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613, 636 (1987). The clearest application of the
rule-based account of language to law was Mark Tushnet's Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, supra note 4, as is perhaps self-evident from the title
of that
article. But the pervasiveness of that conception in legal academia is also apparent from other articles.
See, e.g., Scott Landers, Wittgenstein, Realism, and CLS: UnderminingRule Scepticism, 9 LAW & PHIL.
177 (1990) (arguing against focusing on "expressive" aspect of rules in order to transcend problems
posed by rule-skeptics); James Penner, The Rules of Law: Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Weinrib's
Formalism, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 488 (1988) (attempting to show that law can properly be
based on formalism of Ernest Weinrib).
33. For example:
Regardless of who has the better of the debate [about what, if anything, constitutes following
a rule for the application of a word], it remains the case that the debate itself has an obvious
relevance to those of us who think about regulative rules, the rules governing our moral
conduct, our manners, our religious practices, and perhaps most obviously, our conduct as
citizens in a nation of laws.
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, CAN. J.L. & JURIS., July 1990, at 187.
34. See COLEN MCGINN, WrrrGENSTEIN ON MEANING 1-58 (1984); Gene A. Smith, Wittgenstein and

the Sceptical Fallacy, CAN. J.L. & JURIS., July 1990, at 155.
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that, as a matter of logic, rules cannot determine the applications of words are
laid out in paragraphs 143 through 242 of the PhilosophicalInvestigations-the
so-called "rule following section."' 3536We now focus on the latter argument,
known as "the problem of induction."
The argument proceeds as follows. We formulate rules on the basis of
observed patterns. When we have enough experimental evidence, we feel
confident that we can extrapolate a rule, even a natural law, from the observed
occurrences with which future occurrences will comply. Yet any experimental
evidence necessarily underdetermines any extrapolated hypothesis-i.e., no
experience(s) can sufficiently establish a rule about future experiences. Further,
infinitely many hypotheses are compatible with any number of observed occurrences-that is, any series of experiences can be explained in many different
ways. Past observed regularities can never, as a matter of logic, determine
future occurrences. Hence, so-called natural laws, or more mundane rules, are
merely generalizations about observed regularities in the past, combined with an
expectation of a future that resembles the past.
By analogy, it is clear that past instances of linguistic performance, that is,
past occasions on which a speaker has properly applied a word, cannot give rise
to a rule for the application of a word that determines which future applications
are proper. Rules for the application of words are extrapolations from past
instances of usage. As with natural laws, any future application is compatible
with such an extrapolation because the extrapolation can be nothing more than a
generalization about past applications. 37 Thus, Wittgenstein states:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
35. Baker and Hacker, for example, use that description. See BAKER & HACKER, supra note 28, at 2.
36. The problem of induction originates with Hume. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

§ IV (L.A. Selby-Biggs ed.,

1980) (1949). The straightforward form of Hume's argument is elaborated in the modem literature. See,
e.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 60-69 (Galaxy 1959) (1912); P.F. STRAWSON,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL THEORY 233-63 (1952). In this form, the argument is simply that inductive
generalizations cannot guarantee that the future will be like the past. It is impossible to guarantee that,
as a matter of logic, the sun will not rise in the West tomorrow. In this form, the argument might be
thought to be inapplicable to linguistic rules: while we cannot guarantee that the world will go on as
before, we can guarantee that we will go on as before in the applications of our words. It is the denial of
this last proposition that gives the problem of induction bite for linguistic rules. See NELSON GOODMAN,

The New Riddle of Induction, in FACT, FICTION

AND FORECAST

(1955).

37. Wittgenstein develops this point with a mathematical example. Consider the rule for the
application of the words "plus two." Understanding the meaning of that expression, or having grasped
the rule for its application, involves being able to successfully "add two" to any number we might
choose. But suppose someone claims that for a particular number, on which we have not performed this
operation before, say 1002, "plus two" results in 1005. How would we respond to this "bizarre
skeptic?" Because rules consist of extrapolations from past applications, and, by hypothesis, we have
not added two to this number before, the rule provides no guidance for this new case. As we show in
the text above, and as Wittgenstein makes clear in the Philosophical Investigations, any new application is compatible with the rule, including the skeptic's proposition. Hence, whatever it is that provides
for stability of application in language, and makes it obvious that the proper response is 1004, cannot be
a rule for the application of the expression "plus two." See KRIPKE, supra note 10, at 10-22.
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because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor
conflict here.38

Wittgenstein did not conclude from his rejection of the rule-based account of
language that words really do not guide their applications or that language is
impossible because words have no meaning. As we explain in Part II, Wittgenstein was not skeptical about the capacity of words to determine their applications. Nevertheless, a reading of the PhilosophicalInvestigations that imputes
skepticism to Wittgenstein has had real prominence both in the philosophical 39
and law review literature.40 In this vein, Saul Kripke states:
The skeptical argument, then, remains unanswered. There can be no such
thing as meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a

leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord
with anything we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor
conflict. This is what Wittgenstein said in § 202. 4 '

4. The Implications of Rule-Skepticism in Legal Circles
If language is not a calculus of rules, what is it? Once again, the linguistic
skeptics were staring into the nihilist abyss. Having discarded semantic formalism and now a rule-based account of language, they were again without a theory
about the relationship between words and their applications.
This time, however, the situation was far more traumatic. While it seemed
conceivable that one might find yet another theory of language, this appeared
much less likely for a theory of law. Law, after all, is quintessentially a rulegoverned activity. Skepticism about the capacity of rules to determine their
applications seemed to threaten the whole legal enterprise: If precedents are not
rules for future cases, what can they possibly be?
38.

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,

39. See

supra note 20, § 201.

ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN 166-85 (2d ed. 1987); KRIPKE, supra note 10, at
CRISPIN WRIGHT, WITrGENSTEIN ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 21-38, 223-38 (1980);

7-113;

Chris-

topher Peacocke, Rule-Following: The Nature of Wittgenstein's Arguments, in WrIrGENSTEIN: TO
FOLLOW A RULE (Stephen H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).
40. See Radin, supra note 3; Daniel G. Stroup, Law and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and
Wittgenstein's Philosophy, 18 VAL. U. L. REv. 331 (1984); see also supra note 4 (citing articles that
assume words in legal texts are unavoidably ambiguous without reference to extratextual sources).
41. KRIPKE, supra note 10, at 55. What Wittgenstein actually says in § 202 is:
And hence also "obeying a rule" is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not [the
same thing as] to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule "privately" [by only
looking to your own intentions about how to apply a word]: otherwise thinking one was
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,
KRIPKE,

supra note 10, at 12.

supra note 20, § 202. Kripke probably means to refer to § 201. See
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Thus, rule-skepticism had implications far beyond the rejection of Lon
Fuller's account of linguistic stability. For example, the lessons of ruleskepticism seemed relevant to Herbert Wechsler's Neutral Principles of Adjudication.4 2 Wechsler, of course, maintained that judges could combat legal
indeterminacy by applying the same principles of legal decisionmaking in
relevantly identical future cases. He argued that consistency of application is the
principle that guides judges and that the law is saved from indeterminacy so
long as judges "go on as before,"' 4 3 following the rules laid down, 44 applying
them indifferently.
Yet going on as before is not a determinate business. Many principles can be
extracted from precedents. It is precisely the rule-skeptic's point that any future
application of a rule is compatible with its past applications; that because a rule
is an extrapolation from past instances, it cannot guide future applications.45
The assertion that neutral principles for application provide determinacy in that
application skirts the very issue raised by the induction problem, namely, that
nothing about past application determines how one should go on. Neutral
principles do not constrain the judge's interpretive freedom, since no new
application of a law could conceivably fail to count as going on as before in
accordance with such neutral principles.
5. The Rule-Skeptics' Proposed Solution
a. The Interpretive Community Account. Rule-skepticism threatened both the
stability of language and the Rule of Law. Once again the linguistic skeptics
needed a theory to explain why new applications of words and the laws
constructed from them were not blind leaps in the dark by judges guided by
nothing but personal disposition.
Their new theory, dubbed the interpretive community account, looked to a
source of linguistic stability outside the text-thereby incorporating the ruleskeptics' conclusion that words by themselves cannot determine their applications. The theory basically asserts that the common consensus about how a
community of language users should apply a word introduces the stability in
language that we experience in daily life. More loosely stated, the fact that my
dispositions about the applications of words agree with the dispositions of other
language users in the interpretive community justifies my applications. The
42. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
43. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, § 180.
44. This expression is taken from the title of Mark Tushnet's Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivismand NeutralPrinciples, supra note 4. The Wittgensteinian nature of Tushnet's
argument against Wechsler is particularly evident in his use of the example of the continuation of a
mathematical series that permits an infinite number of extrapolated rules for future applications. Id. at
822; see also KRIPKE, supra note 10, at 18 (arguing that an indefinite number of rules are compatible
with any finite numerical segment); Fish, supra note 7 (rejecting Owen Fiss's "disciplining rules" as
constraints on judges because they are rules for interpretation of rules).
45. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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collective dispositions of language users about how to use words becomes the
extratextual yardstick for proper application. What a word means is not given
by the text, but rather by how most people would be inclined to use it.
The interpretive community account is often attributed to Wittgenstein,4 6 and
almost as often this view can be traced to Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules
and Private Language.4 7 Although, as we discuss in Part II, this attribution to
Wittgenstein is mistaken, the interpretive community account has enjoyed
considerable prominence in the law review literature. Tushnet, for example,
argues that a "community of understanding" in which we "develop a shared
system of meanings" is required to sustain the legitimacy of judicial decisions.48 Stanley Fish argues that a "larger structure of a field of practice[],"
including "norms, standards, definitions, routines, and understood goals that
both define and are defined by [that field]," a structure that lawyers come to
absorb in the course of their professional education and that preselects the
meanings available to them as readers, provides linguistic constraint.49 Stanley
Cavell maintains that our capacity to use words is grounded in shared "routes of
interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor ...all the whirl of
organism that Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life.' "So
Other legal academics have tried to find extratextual interpretive guidance in
the moral principles that judges allegedly share with their community. Joseph
Singer, for example, argues that even if it is conceded that moral principles
cannot offer specific guidance about how to apply a word in most ordinary
circumstances,5 1 they nevertheless can limit judges in a broader way in the
kinds of decisions that they can make and the principles that they can sensibly
appeal to in order to justify those decisions. He writes:
When judges decide cases, they should do what we all do when we face a
moral decision.... [T]here is really nothing about legal reasoning that gives
46. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 3, at 48; Singer, supra note 4, at 34-35; Stroup, supra note 40, at
356. Stanley Fish, whose work is "clearly heavily influenced by Wittgenstein," Langille, supra note 19,
at 461, also adheres to an interpretive community view. See Fish, supra note 7, at 1335. There have
been a number of recent articles, however, that reject the attribution of the interpretive community
approach to Wittgenstein. See Bix, supra note 29, at 107 n.3; Landers, supra note 32, at 178; Langille,
supra note 19, at 455-56; Smith, supra note 34, at 177; Kutz, supra note 5, at 1009-10.
47. KRIPKE, supra note 10; see also Fish, supra note 7; Radin, supra note 3; Singer, supra note 4;
Stroup, supra note 40; Kutz, supra note 5. For an additional source emphasizing interpretive communities in the critical literature, see THOMAS KuHN,THE STRucruRE OF ScIENTiFIc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
48. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 826.
49. Fish, supra note 7, at 1332-33, 1339.
50. STANLEY CAVELL, The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, in MuST WE MEAN WHAT
WE SAY? 44, 52 (1969).
51. This is perhaps not so self-evident. While it is hard to imagine that, as a general matter, there
could be moral considerations determining the application of all words, in the legal context, perhaps all
applications do have moral consequences. So, arguably in the legal context, a moral consensus of a
community, if it exists, could provide adequate guidance for the application of words. For a very good,
brief description of the problem of collapsing the meaning of laws with the question of their normative
desirability, see Schauer, supra note 33.
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the judge[s] an edge on difficult political and moral questions .... Their
power is legitimate only to the extent we view their [moral] decisions as
good.52
Margaret Jane Radin makes a similar appeal to a moral context that limits the
judge's interpretive possibilities:
[Jiudges are an interpretive community conscious of their obligation to act as
independent moral choosers for the good of a society, in light of what that
society is and can become ....

There are still rules. But there are no rules that

nor are there rules that can be
can be understood apart from
5 3 their context;
understood as fixed in time.
b. The Inadequacy of the Interpretive Community Account. Ultimately,-the
interpretive community account is no better a response to the threat of linguistic
indeterminacy than is semantic formalism or a rule-based account of language.
The interpretive community account's first failing is that it makes the notion
of consensus central to the guidance of the application of words and laws.
Hence, it has nothing to say when the community has not reached a consensus.
Yet in the legal context the only time the meaning of the text of law is of
genuine significance is when opposing parties dispute that meaning. Indeed, it is
the traditional assumption of a lack of consensus that necessitates the Rule of
Law as an impartial decisionmaking mechanism in the first place.54 As Radin
points out:
Disputes do break out among lawyers and judges, and litigants do come to
blows, at least metaphorically. If our only way to find out what result is
compelled by a rule is to be part of a community that recognizes [a particular]

action as rule-following, then there is no way to bring any truly disputed cases
55

The second reason that the linguistic community account cannot provide a
sufficient response to the rule-skeptics' indeterminacy challenge is that the
appeal to consensus as a guide for the application of words is itself a rule for the
application of words. As a result, the interpretive community account falls prey
to the rule-skeptics' argument that rules cannot guide new applications because
of the problem of induction. The interpretive community account assumes that
an appeal to an extratextual source of stability for the application of words
circumvents rule-skepticism. But the problem of induction presented by the
rule-skeptic is equally applicable to extratextual rules such as community
consensus because community consensus, like any other rule, can be nothing
52.
53.
54.
55.

Singer, supra note 4, at 65-66.
Radin, supra note 3, at 817.
See Tushnet, supra note 4.
Radin, supra note 3, at 803.
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over and above an extrapolation from past applications by members of the
linguistic community. A community can only reach a consensus about what has
counted as a proper application of a word thus far.
The interpretive community account fails to rescue linguistic stability from
the indeterminacy challenge. For the skeptics, each new application of a word
or legal rule remains "a leap in the dark" and the stability of language that we
take for granted continues as a mystery. On the one hand, it is self-evident to all
that words do have meaning and that something guides our applications of
them. On the other hand, the lack of a viable theory about the relationship
between words and their applications pushes us towards an empirically indefensible linguistic nihilism where words mean whatever we want them to mean.5 6
These, indeed, are the perils of misunderstanding Wittgenstein.
II.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

We argue in this second part of our article that Wittgenstein's work in the
Philosophical Investigations provides a viable antiformalist account of the
relationship between words and their applications. Further, we argue that Wittgenstein's work does not lend support to any kind of indeterminacy argument about
language, and that skeptical readings of the Philosophical Investigations are
mistaken.
A. WITTGENSTEIN AND SKEPTICISM

The basic error of a skeptical reading of the PhilosophicalInvestigations is
that it mistakes Wittgenstein's skeptical voice for his real voice. As Frederick
Schauer puts it:
[This mistake] sees Wittgenstein's interlocutor as the chief player in the
drama, rather than as a Thrasymachus-like philosophical foil. Consequently,
the challenges posed by the interlocutor are taken to be unanswerable and thus
sound. The result of reading Wittgenstein in this way, of course, is the
56. Legal academics who attack the interpretive community account of linguistic stability do not
regard the empirical indefensibility of linguistic nihilism with sufficient seriousness. Levinson insists
that "[t]he united interpretive community that is necessary to Fiss' own argument simply does not
exist." Levinson, supra note 4, at 401. However, he does not remark on the self-refuting absurdity of
his conclusion that therefore "there are as many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as
there are versions of Hamlet." Id. at 391. Levinson remarks in a footnote on "the existence [of] an
earlier generation of 'nihilist' individuals who were led by their own arguments to eschew writing
itself," id. at 402 n.121, but draws no conclusions from this for his own efforts. Similarly, Pierre Schlag
confesses that "one can't find a good philosophical answer to [the question of why deconstruction
should stop at the level of interpretive communities,]" Schlag, supra note 7, at 47, but that this
somehow does not matter because there is a "good rhetorical answer," id., namely, that we feel
comfortable with the idea of an interpretive community. But see Fish, supra note 7, at 1346 ("[N]ihilism is impossible; one simply cannot 'exalt the ... subjective dimension of interpretation' or drain texts
of meanings, and it is unnecessary to combat something that is not possible.") (quoting Fiss, supra note
12, at 746).
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about the possibility of
generation of a profoundly skeptical conclusion
57
following any rule, including a legal rule.
Section 201 of the Philosophical Investigations itself, on which the skeptics
and, most prominently, Saul Kripke rely heavily, supplies the most obvious
textual evidence against the skeptical reading. Kripke quotes only the first part
of that paragraph:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor
conflict here.
But, in fact, Section 201 continues as follows:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstandinghere from the mere fact that in

the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each
one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one
standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call
"obeying" the rule and "going against it" in actual cases.58
Even this solitary paragraph suggests that Wittgenstein thought that the
skeptics' perennial search for the justification of the proper applications of
words was misguided. For the skeptic, every rule is necessarily incapable of
justifying the applications of words because of the problem of induction, and
every inadequate rule prompts the futile search for "another one standing
behind it." But Section 201 makes plain that Wittgenstein did not think that it
follows from the skeptics' rule regress problem that we should resign ourselves
to a skeptical conclusion about the capacity of words to guide applications.
Instead, he says that the rule regress problem shows that the skeptics' understanding of "rule" is mistaken in this context and that there must be another way to
understand the concept of "rule" that avoids seeing it as a justification for the
application of words and, thereby, avoids the regress problem.5 9 Section 201 of

57. Schauer, supra note 33, at 187.
58. Id. (emphasis added); see also Langille, supra note 19, at 488-89 (arguing that skeptics
misunderstand Wittgenstein's central idea of language as an activity); Smith, supra note 34, at 162
(arguing that reliance by critical theorists on Wittgensteinian arguments involves serious misinterpretation).
59. Our argument here relies most heavily on McGiN,, supra note 34, at 42-43 (stating that
"understanding" of a rule is "an unmediated propensity to act"), and on BAKER & HACKER, supra note
28, at 61 (noting that Wittgenstein thought it wrong to suppose that a rule and its application are
connected only through mediation of interpretation).
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the Philosophical Investigations thus does not support a skeptical reading.
Rather, it sows the seed of suspicion that a skeptical reading is a mistake.6 °
Wittgenstein's general attitude towards skepticism substantiates the suspicion
of a skeptical account. At the very beginning of his philosophical career he
wrote:
Skepticism is not irrefutable, but obvious nonsense if it tries to doubt where
no question can be asked. For doubt can only exist where a question exists; a
question can only exist where an answer exists, and this can only exist where
something can be said.6 '

Near the end of his life he expressed an extension of the same notion:
The queer thing is that even though I find it quite correct for someone to say
"Rubbish!" and so brush aside the attempt to confuse him with doubts at
bedrock,-nevertheless, I hold it to be incorrect if he seeks to defend [these
bedrock beliefs].62

It is hard to believe that a man who thought throughout his philosophical
career that skepticism was a kind of nonsense and who felt that attempts to
confuse someone about the bedrock of his beliefs were to be brushed aside as
"rubbish" would make a skeptical argument about the nature of language the
centerpiece of his later work.63
B. A NONSKEPTICAL READING OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

If we grant that a skeptical exegesis of the Philosophical Investigations is
implausible, we still must determine what Wittgenstein did say about language.
As we shall see, Wittgenstein's aim was to dislodge a particular picture of
language that is articulated in Saint Augustine's Confessions and which opens
the PhilosophicalInvestigations:64
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound
they uttered when they meant to point it out.... Thus, as I heard words

repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt

60. A full textual refutation of a skeptical reading is outside our present scope and would merely
duplicate the work of specialists with whom we have no reason to disagree. The most complete textual
refutation of Kripke's reading of the PhilosophicalInvestigations is given in BAKER & HACKER, supra
note 28.
61. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, NOTEBOOKS 1914-16, at 44 (G.H. von Wright & G.E.M. Anscombe eds.
& G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1969).
62. LUDWIG WrIrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 65 (1969).
63. See BAKER & HACKER, supra note 28, at 5-10.
64. THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE (Rex Warner trans., 1963) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE].
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to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.65
Wittgenstein comments as follows:
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of
human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objectssentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language we find
meaning is
the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This 66
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
Ray Monk, in his biography of Wittgenstein, sums up the enterprise this way:
The rest of the PhilosophicalInvestigations was to examine the implications

of this idea and the traps into which it led philosophers, and to suggest routes
out of those traps. These routes all begin by dislodging the (pre-philosophical)
picture of language expressed by Augustine.... In this way, Wittgenstein
67
hoped to dig out philosophical confusion by its pre-philosophical roots.
Wittgenstein's own description of his task is characteristically laconic: "A
simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false
appearance, and this disquiets us." ' 68 Further, "[a] picture held us captive. And
we could not get outside it,69 for it lay in our language and language seemed to
repeat it to us inexorably.",
The false picture described by Wittgenstein is, of course, the picture painted
by semantic formalism-the theory that a word applies to particular items in the
world because the word stands for an object that captures what the particular
items have in common. This object that the word stands for gives the word its
meaning. Accordingly, for semantic formalists proper application of a word

involves checking the particular item in the world against the object for which
the word stands and from which the word's applications can then be read off in
an analytic fashion.
Wittgenstein's argument against this depiction of language has three components. The first part of the argument is that the most popular candidate for the

object against which we might check the applications of words, namely a
mental concept, has no empirical basis: we simply do not experience inner
states that guide us in applying words. 70 The second part of the argument is that,
65. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, § I (quoting AUGUSTINE, supra note 64, at bk. I,
ch. 8).
66. Id.
67. RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUrY OF GENIUS 364 (1990).
68. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, §§ 112, 115.
69. Id.; see also MONK, supra note 67, at 364-65.
70. Wittgenstein's claim is that proper application of a word like "cube" does not depend on the
mental image of a cube coming into one's mind. He argues that it is empirically false that we associate
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even if such mental concepts did exist or other candidates could fill that role,
such concepts could not guide any new applications of a word because of the
problem of induction. 1 Or, to put the point differently, objects for which a word
is supposed to stand cannot guide the word's application because these objects
do not have inherent meaning. The last part of the argument is that the semantic
formalists' picture of language that we are trying to escape prompts an erroneous search for a justification for the application of words because it makes us
think that the meaning of a word, that is, the object for which the word stands, is
prior to and distinct from the applications that can be read off from the word.
Wittgenstein maintains on this last part of the argument against semantic
formalism that there is no gap between meaning and application that must
somehow be bridged by an elusive justification.7 2
It is plain that Wittgenstein does not present a skeptical argument. Although
the skeptics are right that the second part of the argument concludes, intermediately, that there is no justification for the application of words, Wittgenstein's
ultimate position and conclusion is that the absence of such a justification is
unproblematic because the search for a justification is out of place and unnecessary. This third and least intuitive of the steps in the argument deserves further
amplification because it is the most difficult part of Wittgenstein's argument
and, crucially, because it is the part of the argument that brings us back from the
nihilistic abyss towards which the skeptical reading of the PhilosophicalInvestigations lured us.
C. PROPER RULE-FOLLOWING: APPLYING WORDS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

The rule-skeptic argues that rule-following, that is, applying a word in
accordance with its meaning, is a matter of extrapolating guidance from past
applications of a word. But, the skeptics' argument continues, because of the
problem of induction, these past instances of word usage never justify any new
application; each new application is a leap in the dark.

the application of words with a particular mental state. Wittgenstein contends: "What is essential is to
see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be
different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not." PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, § 140.
Further, he argues:
Try not to think of understanding as a "mental process" at all.-For that is the expression
which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do
we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. (A pain's growing more and
less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes.)
Id. § 154; see also MCGINN, supra note 34, at 3-6; supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
71. See PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, §§ 198-201. That part of Wittgenstein's
argument, of course, is the centerpiece of the rule-skeptics' attack on a rule-based conception of
language. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41
72. See PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, § 201.
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In Section 201 of the PhilosophicalInvestigations,Wittgenstein characterizes
this way of conceptualizing the application of a word as a "misunderstanding."
"What [the regress of justifications] shews," he writes, "is that there is a way of
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation,but which is exhibited in what we
call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases."
Wittgenstein supports this claim by reminding us, first of all, what it is
actually like to apply a word. 73 The rule-skeptic makes it seem as if, in applying
a word correctly, we consult something (the meaning of the word) that tells us
that a certain application is correct-as one might consult a recipe in baking a
cake. But this description of how we apply words is overly cerebral. We do not
experience the application of words as a rational process at all: it is unreflective
and automatic. It is automatic in the sense that we do not have any doubt about
how properly to apply a word. By the same token, we do not experience a
feeling of having a choice about how to apply a word. In the absence of such
choice, the skeptic's demand for a rational justification for the application in a
particular case is out of place. It makes no sense to ask for a justification of an
unreflective process.
Thus, Wittgenstein writes:
"How am I able to obey a rule?"-if this is not a question about causes,
then it is about the justification for my following the rule the way I do. If I
have. exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is
turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."
When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the series, I act
quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble me.
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.74
The demand for a justification is out of place because applying a word is not
the sort of activity that one can justify: it is habitual rather than rational; it is the
product of training rather than the result of reflection.
This seemingly innocuous observation about the phenomenology of rulefollowing in the context of applying words has revelatory consequences. To see
this, one must recall that certain kinds of rules are applied by rational reflection.
These are the rules that scientists make about the empirical world. A scientist
formulates a hypothesis about the data he or she observes. This extrapolation of
a rule from a chaotic set of observations is indeed a reflective, cerebral task.
One can imagine a scientist laboring for many months or years before finding a
hypothesis that describes the observed data. On the basis of.this hypothesis, the
scientist makes predictions about the future. Of course, as the rule-skeptic
points out, each of these hypotheses is always inadequate for predicting future
73. See McGitN, supra note 34, at 19-24.
74. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20, §§ 212, 217, 219.
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instances because of the problem of induction. As a result, we find ourselves
"giv[ing] one [justification] after another; as if each one contented us at least
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it." 75
In Section 201, Wittgenstein claims that we are making what might be called
"category mistakes", 7 6 when we attribute the complex of problems that attaches
to scientific hypotheses about the world to rules for the application of words.
The scientist's task of extrapolating a rule from observed instances and predicting future instances on the basis of that rule introduces problems that are not
necessarily endemic to all rules.
The first category mistake is thinking that the application of a rule, for
example, applying a word in accordance with its meaning, is the product of
rational reflection. Reasoned effort is only involved in formulating a rule, such
as a scientific hypothesis that describes empirical data. But, unlike a scientific
hypothesis, a rule for the application of a word does not describe anything: a
new word can mean whatever we want it to mean. That is to say, the formulation of a rule for the application of a word is not a difficult, cerebral task
because there are no empirical constraints on what kind of rule we might want
to have for the application of a word.
The second category mistake is our demand for a justification of the application of a rule, a demand that arises because the scientist makes predictions about
the future. While one can sensibly ask for a justification of a prediction about
the future, one cannot sensibly ask for a justification of what counts as the
application of a rule. That is to say, while it is legitimate to ask the scientist
what justifies his or her expectation that an explanatory hypothesis is correct (to
which the scientist answers: "my past observations"), it is not legitimate to ask
him or her what justifies his or her thinking that a particular empirical observation validates his or her hypothesis. For example, a scientist might have the
hypothesis that "all frogs are green." If he or she is asked what justifies this
hypothesis, he or she will answer that all the frogs observed so far have been
green (and the skeptic will then counter with the problem of induction). But
suppose we find a new green frog and we then asked the scientist the different
question, "what justifies your claim that this green frog counts as an application
of your hypothesis?" That question surely does not make sense: one cannot
question what counts as an application if one concedes that there is a hypothesis. The skeptic cannot rationally say, "I have understood your rule that all
frogs are green, but I do not understand if this green frog accords with your
rule." Understanding a rule consists of the ability to specify what is in accord
with it.
The linguistic skeptics' demand for justifications for the applications of
words arises because the skeptics confuse the legitimate question about the
75. Id. § 201.
76. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949). Category mistakes are systematically misleading expressions that involve "the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms
appropriate to another." Id. at 8.

1996]

MISUNDERSTANDING WITTGENSTEIN

justifiability of predictions about the future with the absurd question about the
justifiability of the applications of a rule itself. The first question only makes
sense in the context of scientific hypothesis: when we apply words there simply
is no question to be asked about the future. There is no sensible, empirical
question to be asked about whether we will apply a particular word in the future
in the same way as we apply it today, in the sense that there is a sensible,
empirical question to be asked about whether there might be some frogs in the
future that are not green. And because there is no question to be asked about
what the future will be like in connection with the application of words, the
problem of induction does not arise.77

When we apply words in accordance with their meanings, there is only the
question of what applications are proper. But one cannot ask, "I know the
meaning of this word, but what justifies your claim that this counts as a proper
application of it?" That question (the "absurd question" referred to above) is
analogous to the question, "what justifies your claim that this green frog counts
as an application of your hypothesis that all frogs are green?" Understanding
the meaning of a word consists in being able to specify what would count as a
proper application of it. 78 Being able to apply a word properly is the test for the
claim that one has understood it. 79 There is no sensible question to be asked
about how the meaning of a word justifies its applications because the meaning
consists of the applications.
We can now summarize Wittgenstein's argument that we do not need to
justify the applications of words in individual instances. The argument centers
around the proposition that our picture of a rule as a scientist's explanatory
hypothesis introduces a complex of problems about the scientific method that is
unrelated to rule-following per se. One aspect of this picture is the overly
reflective, cerebral account that the rule-skeptic gives of rule-following. In fact,
we do not consult the meaning of a word, like a recipe for baking a cake, prior
to applying the word. We confuse this kind of rule-following with the scientist's
reasoned efforts in formulating a descriptive hypothesis on the basis of empirical observations. The picture of the scientific method also leads us to ask for a
justification for the application of a rule. The scientist justifies his or her
predictions on the basis of the rule that he or she has extrapolated from past
77. See BAKER & HACKER, supra note 28, at 92.
78. See Marmor, supra note 17, at 75. Marmor describes Wittgenstein's views on rule-following in
these terms:
To understand a rule is to be able to specify which actions are in accord with it (and hence
which would go against it), just as to understand a proposition is to be able to specify its truth
conditions. In other words, it simply doesn't make sense to say that one has understood a rule
and yet he doesn't know the actions which are in accord with it.
Id.
79. Wittgenstein states: "It would be quite misleading, in this last case, for instance, to call the
words ['Now I can go on'] a 'description of a mental state.'-One might rather call them a 'signal'; and
we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do." PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,
supra note 20, § 180.
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empirical observations and, so, the problem of induction arises. But there is no
such problem for identifying what shall count as a proper application of a rule
for the application of a word. Proper applicationsof the rule are given by the
meaning of the rule itself. We can sensibly ask for the justification of a
prediction about the future, but it is irrational to question what shall count as a
fulfilled prediction.
No evidence supports the skepticism about the capacity of language to guide
the application of words that some have attributed to Wittgenstein. The Philosophical Investigations does not support a linguistic indeterminacy claim. Wittgenstein rejects the charge that the application of a word needs to be justified in
a particular case. His arguments for that proposition are difficult, and it is hard
to imagine that many legal academics will take the time to examine them in
detail. Nevertheless, such an examination is important because it sets the record
straight: the linguistic indeterminacy argument can draw no support from
Wittgenstein because the skeptical reading of the PhilosophicalInvestigations is
wrong. It follows that language is safe and that it is not particularly malleable. It
is undeniable that there are many threats to the model of the Rule of Law-but
linguistic indeterminacy is not one of them.
III. To

8°
NONSENSE AND BACK AGAIN

What explains the attention that legal academics have given to Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations? One answer might be that a concern with the
stability of language is part of the heritage of Legal Realism. But many
philosophers have written about language, and one seldom sees references to
their work in the law review literature.81 More likely, the reason for the
heightened attention to Wittgenstein's work lies in its utility to a particular
political agenda. Academics who question the legitimacy of the Rule of Law
model find a skeptical reading of the Philosophical Investigations useful because it puts in doubt the basic faith that a unique answer in a particular case
can be conclusively derived from the application of a general pre-existing rule.
The skeptic says: if the proper future use of words cannot be conclusively
derived from a rule for their application, then the legal rules that these words
embody can hardly be derived in this manner either.
A skeptical reading of Wittgenstein is doubly appealing because the interpretive community account of linguistic stability springs from that skepticism. For
Critical Legal Scholars, the interpretive community account readily translates
into a claim that the legitimacy of judicial decisions is to be decided not by
reference to precedent (because precedent cannot guide new applications anyway), but by a supposed moral consensus about the kinds of outcomes that are
80. This phrase is used by BAKER & HACKER, supra note 28, at 97.
81. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) (discussing functions of speech

and performative versus constative utterances); W.V.O.
indeterminacy of language).

QUINE,

WORD AND OBJECT (1960) (discussing
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just in a particular case. The implications of that conclusion are twofold. First, it
legitimates a disregard for precedent and, as a consequence, a politically active
role for judges. In addition, the moral consensus view offers the prospect of
future legal decisions that are closer in line with the academic's own moral
preferences at a time when his or her views will be held by a majority. Thus, for
example, Joseph Singer writes:
This [critical] scholarship has undermined the traditional idea that legal
reasoning is an objective and rational way to decide what rules and institutions we should have. We have proposed instead that legal reasoning is a way
of simultaneously articulating and masking political and moral commitment....
The only thing that makes [judicial decisionmaking] appear mysterious is
the myth that judges have an advantage that ordinary citizens do not have that
allows them to adjudicate value conflicts rationally: legal reasoning .... [But]
j]udges have no better knowledge than anyone else of how to answer those
questions. Their power is legitimate only to the extent we view their decisions
as good and to the extent we view the current methods of choosing judges and
allowing them to adjudicate disputes
as a valid alternative to other sorts of
82
dispute resolution and lawmaking.
A number of law review articles assert that Wittgenstein supports the legitimacy of judicial activism. For example, Daniel Stroup asserts:
Wittgenstein frees legal words from the tyranny of rigidly fixed meanings and
thus ...provides a philosophy that allows for growth.... [Thus], even if
[legal formalism] were not fraught with such disastrous social consequences,
it would still be inadequate for the simple reason that human beings just do
83
not use words in this way-and judges are no exception.
Similarly, Radin writes:
A judge's decision in response to a rule responds necessarily to the community as a whole and not just to what the legislature has said.... [I]f we accept
the Wittgensteinian view we must recognize that rules are not immutable....
The traditional notion of law as rules cannot readily accommodate the idea
that the contours of the law may shift through no legislative or official act but
84
merely through social change.
The defense of a skeptical reading of Wittgenstein is particularly strident
when confronted with other readings of Wittgenstein that are less destabilizing.
For example, one law review author admits that "Wittgenstein might appear to
82. Singer, supra note 4, at 6, 63-64.
83. Stroup, supra note 40, at 358.
84. Radin, supra note 3, at 808-09.
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but then goes on to draw comfort

Wittgenstein effectively allows critical legal theory to trash structuralism's
disempowering implications while retaining its liberating potential.
Wittgenstein's work on the limitations of our language exposes the fundamental position of86 structure and its necessary location as being merely
essentialist claims.
Legal academics have been slow to retreat from Wittgenstein's "liberating
potential." Perhaps interest in Wittgenstein will fade rapidly if his work is no
longer thought useful by those who initially brought it into discussion in legal
circles. Wittgenstein was not a skeptic about language, and perhaps legal
scholars could have avoided a mistaken reading if his work had not seemed to
have a "liberating potential" temptation. Reading Wittgenstein without such a
careful eye on the perceived political consequences of his thought could have
prevented the arduous intellectual journey to the interpretive community account, and the even more demanding retreat from that account to a nonskeptical
reading of Wittgenstein. But however arduous, the trip is not in vain if it
prepares us, independent of political consequences, to reassess Wittgenstein's
relevance to legal theory in its true light. For in the nonskeptical posture that his
philosophy ultimately assumes, the legal landscape takes on a familiar-if
somewhat unfashionable-shape, and we rediscover the virtues of the allegedly
stodgy predecessor of contemporary Critical Legal Studies. American legal
theory has its own tradition of nonskeptical antiformalism, and this tradition
resonates with Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language. Wittgenstein, in
short, invites us to reconsider the intellectual history of Legal Realism, a brief
journey on which, safely back at Ithaka, we now propose to depart.
IV.

LEGAL REALISM AND ANTIFORMALISM

A. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIFORMALIST THOUGHT

Wittgenstein's lifelong concern with the problems created by semantic formalism parallels one element of the broad movement in Anglo-American philosophy and social science, beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century
and described by its most insightful historian as "The Revolt Against Formalism."' 87 The social and cultural pressures antecedent to the "revolt" came from
many quarters. Explosive economic growth in the post-Civil War period created
organizations and fortunes on a scale hitherto unprecedented. Vast immigration
and the transportation revolution brought by a continental rail network joined
the tragic disruptions of the war to remake American society in demographic
85. Brainerd, supra note 7, at 1256.
86. Id. at 1260.
87. MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1957).
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terms. The Darwinian revolution, in which all Western societies were caught up,
altered the nation's intellectual experience. The immigrant working class, with
its own intellectual culture, transmitted the spread of socialist, anarchist, and
other radical social criticism. Rapid expansion of higher education induced
changes in the organization of scholarship; newly professionalizing social
scientists confidently began to shape the agenda for systematic social research.
These fermenting forces resulted in an outburst of new thinking about social
life. From philosophy and history to economics and law, voices urged abandonment of old ways of thinking and proposed new ones that shared important
features.
Whatever the name ascribed to the new modes of thought-pragmatism,
instrumentalism, institutionalism, realism, or the new history-the properties
held in common included a precisely congruent disdain for the reigning verities
in each of the disciplines. Each was said to be "formalist"-mired in abstractions, bogged down in conceptualism, engaged in deductive reasoning from
static premises, unconcerned and uninformed about constantly changing social
reality. To employ the strongest invective of Thorstein Veblen, old social
88
thought was "taxonomy."
On the other hand, recognition of the ceaselessness of change reanimated
new thought. "Taxonomy" was a word of derogation to Veblen because it
implied the condition of pre-Darwinian biological science, which tried to
deduce the relationship among the diverse forms of life without grasping the
realities of change. The Darwinian revolution pressed on systems of thought
that depended on static order. Thus, the new modes of thought shared not only a
distaste for the "formalism" of their predecessors, but also a set of basic
commitments that Morton White has called "historicism" and "cultural organicism." 89 "Historicism," as a label, conjoined two sets of ideas, each with
Darwinian roots. The first was that history matters: ideas, practices, and institutions-like Darwin's organisms-are constrained by their histories. In a world
of ceaseless change, entities are what they are becoming; what they become
cannot be separated from what they have been. The second component of
historicism, closely related but intractably portentous in its consequences, recognized the instability of meaning. Just as Darwin's orchids 90 reflected selection
of old morphology for new purposes-in which the imperfection of making do
by pouring new wine into old bottles stood as the best demonstration of natural
selection-the new social thinkers perceived institutions, practices, and ideas
losing their old meanings and taking on new ones, often in unconscious
response to what Holmes was to call "the felt necessities of the time.', 9 '
88. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Sentry Press 1965) (1899).

89. WHITE, supra note 87, at 12.
90. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF FLOWERS ON PLANTS OF THE SAME
SPECIES (London, J. Murray 1877).
91. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW].
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Economic institutions, as Veblen described them in The Theory of the Leisure
Class,92 like legal rules considered by Holmes in The Common Law, 9 3 altered
their significance-their meaning-over time in response to social motives
individuals could never consciously articulate.
Along with the historicism of the new modes of social thought came the
commitment to investigate social institutions and practices in the fullest possible context. Just as society's component entities could not be divorced from
their history without violence to understanding, they could not be divorced from
one another. Treating social life organically meant drawing upon a plurality of
perspectives for investigation. Veblen rejected utilitarian and neoclassical economic thought for its reductive limitations on the psychology of social experience and insensitivity to ethnographic data. Holmes demanded that lawyers
forsake the protective concealment of logic to investigate the history, economics, and sociology of legal choice.
Taken together, historicism and cultural organicism were facets of the same
inclination-to view social phenomena not in terms of fixed conceptual categories, but through their vertical extension in time and horizontal relationship to
the rest of the milieu. This inclination flowered early in the legal scholarship of
Holmes: in Holmes's thought from the late 1870s through the mid-1890s one
can trace the development of new antiformalist legal ideas.9 4
It is not surprising to find Holmes sensitive to speculations attacking linguistic formalism. Yet American legal theory first encountered Wittgenstein through
the work of John Dewey. Over the course of their long lives, Holmes's
intellectual concerns recurrently meshed with those of Dewey. The parallels
began from a deep shared distrust of formal approaches to thought. 95 Just as
Holmes declared in the opening manifesto of The Common Law that "[t]he life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,", 96 Dewey maintained that
formal logic was "fons et origo malorum in philosophy.", 97 Dewey emphatically rejected the view that experience was "a knowledge-affair," claiming
instead that the cornerstone of philosophy should be a view of experience as
''an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social
environment. " 9 8 Knowledge arises from our experimental interactions with the
surrounding environment, and therefore as a product of the physical or social
problems that stimulate us to inquire or to attempt to predict the world's
behavior. "Inquiry," Dewey said, "occupies an intermediate and mediating

92. See VEBLEN, supra note 88.
93. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 91.
94. See id.; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL

PAPERS 167 (1920) [hereinafter HOLMES, The Path of the Law].
95. The connection between the thought of Dewey and Holmes is one of the major themes of
Morton White's book. See WHIrE, supra note 87.
96. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 91, at 1.
97. JOHN DEWEY, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE 3 (1917).

98. Id.
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place in the development of an experience." 99 Holmes, in a sentence more
frequently repeated than comprehended, told law students to seek the meaning
of legal words by locating their inquiry in precisely such a context: "If you
want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the
law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." 100
In considering these elements of "pragmatist" or American antiformalist
thought, scholars often place emphasis on the "instrumentalism," or evident
consequentialism, of these concepts. But the insistence on ideas as defined by
their consequences in socially situated experimentation with the environment
had another implication. As Dewey maintained in the very title of his 1916
work, Creative Intelligence, our minds create meaning by the pattern of their
inquiry. Linguistic formalism is incompatible with such a view. For Dewey,
knowledge-including fundamentally the knowledge of language-could not
be located externally, where we are merely spectators. Dewey believed that
Augustine's account of the origin of our linguistic knowledge-that adults show
us the objects to which words apply, and we learn the rules of application from
them'°J-was an impermissible apriorism: "The conception that we begin with
a known visual quality which is thereafter enlarged by adding on qualities
apprehended by the other senses does not rest upon experience ....,,o2 The

Augustinian image that disquieted Wittgenstein also disquieted Dewey.
Where Dewey considered the general nature of our knowledge, Holmes
concerned himself with knowledge of legal rules. For Holmes, interested though
he was in philosophical issues, the matter at hand was not linguistic formalism
or the spectator theory of knowledge. But just as Dewey saw linguistic and
other knowledge constructed by experimentation, resulting in predictions about
the future rather than eternal deductive certainties, Holmes denied that "knowing" the law could be other than a history of experimental contact with legal
behavior. Dewey said that "[kinowledge is always a matter of the use that is
made of experienced natural events, a use in which given things are treated as
indications of what will be experienced under different conditions;"' 0 3 Holmes
made the same idea concrete for legal theory in one of the most famous of all
his aphorisms: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."'04 "Knowing" a legal rule, in
Holmes's sense, could not imply an ability to "read off" the applications of the
rule by logical processes. Disagreement over the meaning of legal words, and
99. Id.
100. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 94, at 171.
101. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 64, at 25 (describing how children learn from adults the names of
objects).
102. DEWEY, supra note 97, at 49.
103. Id. at 47.
104. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 94, at 173.
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the incidence of the rules they compose, is endemic rather than exceptional:
I once heard a very eminent judge say that he never let a decision go until he
was absolutely sure that it was right. So judicial dissent often is blamed, as if
and,
it meant simply that one side or the other were not doing their sums 0right,
5
come.1
would
inevitably
agreement
trouble,
if they would take more
When judges apply rules to cases, Holmes believed, they respond to the "felt
necessities of the time,"' 1 6 a bedrock of examined and unexamined belief,
prejudice, and intuition, rather than the demands of logical entailment. The
judge gains legal knowledge in a Deweyan fashion by struggling to predict and
control the social environment. Yet "[t]he language of judicial decision is
mainly the language of logic." 01 7 In this sense, Holmes asserted in both The
Common Law and The Path of the Law that legal development had been blind:
as the theorist sought the meaning of legal rules in the logical entities they
appeared to represent, the judges decided cases in relation to an unexpressed
groundwork of fundamental belief. Meaning is contingent not on logic, but on
processes easier to describe as "habit" or "inarticulate and unconscious judgment.' 1 8 Hence, "[w]e do not realize how large a part of our law is open to
0 9 Our
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind."'
discomfort with this contingency of meaning leads us to favor formal expressions: "[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind." "o Standing before Boston University
law students in 1897, Holmes precipitated the legal theory of the coming
century into confrontation with that uncomfortable contingency: "But certainty
generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." ,"
Even if meaning in the law is inescapably dependent upon the "habit" of
"public mind" and "felt necessity," Holmes did not concede that it is therefore
indeterminate. While logic could not be used to replace such dependency,
judging nonetheless constrained interpretation. For example, Holmes wrote:
Suppose a contract is executed in due form and in writing to deliver a lecture,
mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks that the promise will be
construed to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when
he is ready. The court says that it means within a reasonable time. The parties
are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the2court, yet neither of them
meant what the court declares that they have said."1
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
I11.
112.

Id. at 180.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 91, at 1.

HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 94, at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177-78.
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For Holmes, objectivism in the law-refusing to tailor the scope of liability to
the "will" of the parties-ensured that meaning, however contingent, remained
determinate. We must predict on the basis of experience what the court will
regard as "a reasonable time," but we (and the judge) need not engage in the
philosophically sterile attempt to assess the past mental states of the contracting
parties." 3 Making a contract is an affair of action-an exchange of signs.
Meaning, and hence contractual liability, results neither from logical rules of
contract interpretation nor from the local meaning the signs had for the parties
who exchanged them:
In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able
even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making of a contract depends not
on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two
sets of external signs-not on the 4parties' having meant the same thing but on
their having said the same thing." 1
At best, however, objectivism of the Holmesian kind merely postpones the
encounter with the problem of meaning. If formal rules cannot govern the
application of law to social situations, like language to the world, we must be
able to give some other justification for the particular applications made by
particular judges if we are to save the coherence of the law. According to
Holmes, we should ultimately be able to save the meanings of our legal words
by replacing individual formalist accounts with realist ones, in which logical
propositions give way to articulations of our previously inarticulate mental
habits or felt necessities. Holmes stated that "a body of law is more rational and
more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely
to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are
stated or are ready to be stated in words." "-5 Our grounds for desiring our ends,
of course, cannot be offered as logical propositions, or defended by proof. We
cannot use rules to justify applying rules.
We may now draw some tentative parallels between the effect of antiformalist
accounts of linguistic meaning on American legal thought in the early twentieth
century and the situation created by Wittgenstein's PhilosophicalInvestigations.
The antiformalist conception of experience and Wittgenstein's argument from
the problem of induction offer related but distinct reasons to discard rule-based
113. This single point by no means exhausts the significance of objectivism in Holmes's thought.

For a broader consideration of its importance, see MORTON J. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33-63, 109-43 (1992). The account of
Holmes's thought given here differs from Horwitz's in several respects, including, most importantly,
Horwitz's belief in the formalism of the "early" Holmes. See Eben Moglen, The Transformation of
Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 (1993) (reviewing The Transformation ofAmerican Law).
114. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 94, at 178. The same notion of contract formation as
a semiotic event is found in HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 91, at 242.
115. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 94, at 186.
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accounts of language. Dewey found inquiry to be "intermediate and mediating"
in our development of knowledge; Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of our
words rested on beliefs or habits that are philosophically erroneous to defend by
rational argument. In the long metaphorical identification between rationality
and sight in our philosophical tradition, language was said to be applied
"blindly." 116
Blindness, however, was a more serious problem for lawyers than for linguists. The application of words in the philosophy of language is a problem
with a low normative stake, whereas an inability to give any defense of our
application of legal rules threatens our basic conception of legality. In The Path
of the Law, Holmes offered for the first time the hope that a science of values
would allow us to give rational but nonformal justifications of rule applications,
by stating the consequences desired and the reasons for desiring them. This
aspiration was to be frequently repeated in the work of those Legal Realist
scholars who followed Holmes.
B. THE LATER HISTORY OF REALISM-RULE-SKEPTICS AND FACT-SKEPTICS

By the early 1930s, a group of active and talented young scholars had
accepted the challenge posed by Holmes to the formalist tradition in legal
theory. A diverse and complicated movement, 1 7 the new "Realist" jurisprudence explicitly acknowledged its combined philosophical debt to American
pragmatism and "logical positivism," which it associated with Wittgenstein and
Carnap. Felix Cohen undertook the most sophisticated and insightful discussion
of the relations between these intellectual developments. "18
In TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach," 9 Cohen returned
to the antiformalist starting point, with the proposition that the language of
116. The historicist element in antiformalist legal thought accepted the consequences readily,
particularly because the "blindness" of biological evolution was one of the most exciting and
distressing insights of the Darwinian revolution. The Common Law could well be said to have as its
major theme the blind evolution of our legal ideas.
117. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298 (1911); William A. Clark et al., The Business Failures
Project-A Problem in Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek,
The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J.
255 (1961): John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253
(1947); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2),
46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pts. I & 2), 28
COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929); Nathan Isaacs, Fault and Liabilty, 31
HARv. L. REV. 954 (1918); Karl N. Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923);
Hessel E. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform, 34 COLUIM. L. REV. 207 (1934).
118. The role of Felix Cohen and his father, the philosopher and legal theorist Morris Raphael
Cohen, in the Realist project has been underemphasized in much of the subsequent scholarship. For a
current attempt to reduce the influence of Karl Llewellyn's grasp on Realism, restoring the Cohens to a
more prominent position, see HORWITZ, supra note 113, at 160-68, 190-210.
119. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
823 (1935).
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traditional legal explanation was "transcendental nonsense" because it defined
legal words by their relation to one another, rather than through their perceived
consequences. Cohen stated:
Our legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is to say, concepts
which cannot be defined in terms of experience, and from which all sorts of
empirical decisions are supposed to flow. Against these unverifiable concepts
modern jurisprudence presents an ultimatum. Any word that cannot pay up in
the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be declared bankrupt, and we are to
20
have no further dealings with it.'
Such sentiment led, as one would expect, to adoption of two of Holmes's central
ideas: first, that law is a function of actual judicial decision, and successful
prediction of judicial decision is, therefore, the goal of the lawyer; and second,
that " '[s]ocial policy' will be comprehended not as an emergency factor in
legal argument but rather as the gravitational field that gives weight to any rule
or precedent."121 Cohen took pains to show in several areas of doctrine that
reifications of conceptions without empirical consequences (such as the "location" of a corporation, or the "property right" in words used as tradenames) led
to decisions answering questions, which, quoting Wittgenstein, he derided as
"of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical
22
than the Beautiful." 1
As Cohen demonstrated, escaping the empty circularity of formalist legal
analysis required abandonment of the basic belief that legal meaning could be
ascertained by following rules of legal reasoning. Cohen represented the "ruleskeptic" version of Legal Realism, which elucidated legal phenomena in relation not to the logic of the rules, but rather in relation to the mental habits and
bedrock beliefs of the judges. But Cohen perceived more fully than did Holmes
in The Path of the Law the alternative courses that followed from the rejection
of rule-following. If prediction of the individual judicial decision was the
essence of law and involved familiarity with the bedrock beliefs of the judges,
then legal study ought to be directed at compiling a "publication, showing the
political, economic, and professional background and activities of our various
judges.... Our understanding of the law will be greatly enriched when we learn
more about how judges think, about the exact extent of judicial corruption, and
23
about the techniques for investigating legally relevant facts." 1
But such a result, however attractive to the antiformalist for its rhetorical
effect in stimulating rage among the less irreverent, was normatively unsatisfactory. Regarding individual judicial decisions as the product of "hunch" was
anathema to Cohen. Legal meaning threatened to become like linguistic mean120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 823.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 823-24 (quoting LUDWIG
Id. at 846.

WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

(1922)).
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ing-an artifact of idiosyncrasy, irreproducible and inexplicable. Confronted by
his intellectual collaborators' tendency in this direction, Cohen undertook another move we have seen before:
[A]ctual experience does reveal a significant body of predictable uniformity in
the behavior of courts. Law is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product
of judicial bellyaches. Judges are human, but they are a peculiar breed of
humans, selected to a type and held to service under a potent system of
governmental controls. Their acts are "judicial" only within a system which
provides for appeals, rehearings, impeachments, and legislation. The decision
that is "peculiar" suffers erosion-unless it represents the first salient manifestation of a new social force, in which case it soon ceases to be peculiar.
A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive every decision
as something more than an express*ion of individual personality, as concomitantly and even more importantly a function of social forces .... I2n
The claim of empirical demonstration in the first sentence, bolstering a priori
statements of faith in the second, is a sign of the intellectual struggle underway
in the passage. But Cohen is clearly formulating the idea of interpretive
community.' 25 Meaning is socially constructed, as a result of the "social

forces" that bring judges ultimately to agree, and what the community agrees
upon is what the law means. Thus, Cohen writes:
A judicial decision is a social event. Like the enactment of a Federal statute,
or the equipping of police cars with radios, a judicial decision is the intersection of social forces: Behind the decision are social forces that play upon it to
give it a resultant momentum and direction .... Only by probing behind the
decision to the forces which it reflects, or projecting beyond the decision the
do we come to an understanding of the
lines of its force upon the future,
26
meaning of the decision itself.1
Like Holmes, Cohen recognized that a theory of law based on predictions of
judges is not useful to judges, who must do more than predict their own
decisions. A positivism resting all legal meaning on the behavior of the judges-

however informed by an understanding of the social "forces" involved-cannot
fully replace the formalism Cohen put aside. For while the conceptualist judge
can reach the "right" result solely on the basis of logic, the Realist judge cannot
go home satisfied after merely reflecting the current balance of social forces.
Ethical criticism, or a "science of values," remained, for Cohen as for Holmes,

124. Cohen, supra note 119, at 843.
125. The notion of an interpretive community of judges under the institutional and ideological
constraints of the legal tradition has more recently made its appearance in the Fiss-Fish debate. See
Fish, supra note 7.
126. Cohen, supra note 119, at 843.
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a necessary element of legal knowledge. The philosopher of language may rest
content with the conclusion that our linguistic behavior is bound by rules that
cannot be justified by logical argument. Not so the legal theorist. Returning to
the ubiquitous metaphor linking sight with the rational faculty, Cohen concludes
that "[Iegal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of
values." 127
Cohen's convening of the interpretive community was not the only Realist
approach to the problem of meaning. Jerome Frank, for example, took the route
of "fact-skepticism." Frank's famous argument in Law and the Modem Mind 12 8
was that judges, lawyers, and lay people cooperated in maintaining a mythologized conception of the certainty of law. This false picture of legal certainty
arose from individual psychology-from our neurotic need for an omnipotent
father. Unsurprisingly, in view of his starting point, Frank concluded that trial
court factual findings are the indeterminate outcomes of an inherently biased
and imprecise process. 129 Thus, legal certainty was a myth precisely because
factual certainty was impossible. Frank's skepticism also explicitly rejected the
notion that legal meaning could be determined by the application of rules. 130
For Frank, like Cohen, the danger of radical skepticism was apparent. If the
supposedly stable meaning of legal texts depends on application of purported
general rules to indeterminate facts, can the concept of the Rule of Law be
saved? Frank's rescue attempt rested on his invocation of music to express the
substance of legal interpretation. 13 Comparing legal interpretation to musical

127. Id. at 849.
128. FRANK, supra note 117.
129. This line of argument embodied what has been called fact-skepticism, as opposed to the
rule-skepticism represented by Felix Cohen.
130. See generally Jerome Frank, Words and Music, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947) [hereinafter
Frank, Words and Music]; Jerome Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1948) [hereinafter
Frank, Say It With Music].
131. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTrH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949)
[hereinafter FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL]; Frank, Words and Music, supra note 130. In describing the
similarities between musical interpretation and statutory interpretation, Frank writes:
Krenek, a brilliant modem musical composer, criticizes those musical "purists" who insist on
what they call "work-fidelity." The performer of a musical piece ... should, say the purists,
engage in "authentic interpretation" which eliminates the interpreter altogether, by the
"actual rendition" of the musical symbols just as they were written, in order to "serve the
true intention of the composer." Krenek shows that often such literalism is absurd ....
There is a middle ground, between disregarding the composer's intentions and being intelligently imaginative.
No more than in the case of music, can differences in [statutory] interpretation be prevented.
Yet the wise legislature will be in accord with Krenek's attitude towards musical performers:
A judge with an imaginative personality supplies "an increment of vitality that is ...
desirable ... and truly necessary in order to put" the legislative "message across," for only
such a judge can read a statute "with an insight which transcends its literal meaning."
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,

supra at 295-96, 297, 300.
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performance, Frank emphasized the antiformalist, Gestalt character of legal
thought:
In deciding any case where the testimony is in conflict or where credibility is
otherwise a pivotal factor (and most cases fit in that category), a court
contrives, so to speak, an individual song (a song for that particular case) in
which the legal rules are the music and the "facts" are the words. Those two
gestalt), the unique character of which derives
elements fuse in a composite (a
32
principally form the "facts."' 1
Jerome Frank's point about the nature of musical as compared to legal
interpretation precisely parallels the arguments against formalism in language.
The impossibility of demonstrating one's musical understanding by logic precisely matches Wittgenstein's conclusion about language application. Law, for
Frank, became at best a "guessy art." 133 Our meanings are incapable of rational
demonstration, resting on indeterminately inaccurate factual perceptions. Though
Frank never expressly acknowledged failure, his critical weakness was the
problem of normative justification for these "guessy" and contingent outcomes.
The writings of Felix Cohen and Jerome Frank demonstrate that the debate
over linguistic indeterminacy and its consequences for legal theory has occurred
twice in twentieth-century America, under the impetus of differing but closely
related lines of philosophical speculation. Antiformalism in the philosophy of
language joined the persistent antiformalist theme in the intellectual history of
law to bring into doubt the stability of legal meaning by denying the coherence
of rule-following. In the writings of Holmes and Felix Cohen we perceive the
same uncertainties that beset later readers of the Philosophical Investigations
who, like the rule-skeptic Realists, wanted to find justification for the Rule of
Law in an antiformalist environment. The fact-skeptics' responses were less
sophisticated than the more recent attempts to avoid the same basic pitfall, but
then Jerome Frank did not have a copy of the PhilosophicalInvestigations to
ponder. The Road to Nonsense was shorter in 1949, and the way back was even
more obscure.
C. RECOVERING REALISM-A CALL FOR LEGAL INVESTIGATIONS

As we have tried to show in the first three Parts of this article, a primary
enterprise of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was the criticism of
semantic formalism without risk to the integrity of linguistic meaning. Wittgenstein's resolution lay in recognizing limits to skepticism. This approach coincides with the descriptive legal theory advocated by Holmes and the ruleskeptic Realists. For Holmes and his intellectual descendants, the limits of
skepticism were implicit in the pragmatism they adopted, in full accord with the
132. Frank, Words and Music, supra note 130, at 1277.
133. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 131, at 37 (comparing trial court tasks with job of
historian, both of which rely on second-hand constructions of past rather than actual knowledge of past
events).

1996]

MISUNDERSTANDING WITrGENSTEIN

notion that "doubt can only exist where a question exists; a question can only
exist where an answer exists, and this can only exist where something can be
said." 134
It would be charming to find that the disease of which Realism fell ill, and
which much Critical Legal Studies evinces in its florid state, could be cured by
an application of the true Philosophical Investigations-with its signature
distaste for radical skepticism. Unfortunately, as readers will have surmised, this
is not the case. Wittgenstein's project offers to save linguistic rules from a
hypothesis of indeterminacy: when we obey a linguistic rule we need not
burden ourselves with an obligation to justify the application-to know a rule is
to know its applications. But legal rules, unlike linguistic ones, cannot be
"blindly obeyed." Our conception of the Rule of Law requires that our rules be
more than the commands of an Austinian sovereign. The law must give reasons
when rules conflict and explain why only one rule is "right" in the specific case.
Justice may be blind, but only if it is not mute.
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations by no means licenses abandonment of meaning. That linguistic meaning rests on bedrock habits and beliefs
that are fruitless and erroneous to defend fully satisfies the needs of the project
on which Wittgenstein embarked-the removal of problems created by adherence to semantic formalism from philosophical discourse. The normative status
of the resulting human language system is, for Wittgenstein, a prime example of
a meaningless concept.
But the intellectual enterprise of legal theorists, who enlisted the Philosophical Investigations in the first place, is intrinsically normative. As Felix Cohen
recognized, skepticism about rules as generators of legal meaning makes problems regarding those preformal habits and beliefs that shape legal outcomes.
Wittgenstein's language model can readily dispense with justifications for applications of words. But one cannot consistently embrace both the Rule of Law
and an absence of justification for the application of legal rules. It was the hope
of Holmes, Felix Cohen, and other rule-skeptic Realists that the Rule of Law
could be divorced from rule formalism, by substitution of a more complete
"science of values." Such legal investigations would replace formal justifications of the application of rules, thereby rescuing both the Rule of Law and the
meaning of words.
Scholars have advanced other normative accounts of the origin of "rules" or
"standards" in the legal system. As Mark Kelman notes, the approaches central
to Critical Legal Studies have not always extended their skepticism to the level
of linguistic meaning, but they have all rejected the concept of the Rule of Law.
But both Realists committed to rescuing the Rule of Law and adherents of
Critical Legal Studies who have chosen other ideological viewpoints have
confronted the problem of the decay of linguistic meaning, and Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations has much to say to both camps. Those who mis134. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 44.
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read may find themselves approaching nonsense at an accelerated pace. This
appears to have happened, for reasons we suggest above, to those whose
ideological commitments counsel less prudence in attacking meaning. For those
who read Wittgenstein properly, the situation is sufficiently grave, but not
hopeless. The Realist position, seeking to save the concept of the Rule of Law,
has long been silent, and we can only hope that the news that meaning is alive
and well may help to stir a revival. For those who believe in the Rule of
Law-to paraphrase a less sincere retrospective on intellectual developments of
the 1930s-it should be perfectly clear that "we're all Realists now."

